This paper analyzes international antitrust enforcement when multinational …rms operate in several markets with antitrust authorities in each market. We We thank participants in various conferences and seminars for helpful comments.
Introduction
This paper analyzes antitrust enforcement in the presence of multi-market contact. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one market is a¤ected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. More speci…cally, we consider international antitrust enforcement when multinational …rms operate in several markets with antitrust authorities (AAs) in each market. In the context of international trade, it is a natural assumption that the products in each local market are substitutes due to the possibility of arbitrage across markets. 1 To motivate our study, consider the "vitamin cartel" case of Empagran S.A. v. F.
Ho¤ man-LaRoche. In this case, Empagran S.A. in Ecuador and other foreign companies …led suit against F. Ho¤man-LaRoche of Switzerland and numerous other foreign companies for an alleged international price-…xing conspiracy. An interesting aspect of the Empagran case is that it concerned a price-…xing conspiracy that allegedly took place overseas even though the case itself was …led in a US federal district court. Foreign plainti¤s, suing under the U.S. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), claimed that "the cartel raised prices around the world in order to keep prices in equilibrium with United States prices in order to avoid a system of arbitrage" and therefore that "the foreign plainti¤s were injured as a direct result of the increases in United States prices even though they bought vitamins abroad." 2 In response, F. Ho¤man-LaRoche moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws, because the injuries plainti¤s sought to redress were sustained in transactions that lacked any direct connection to United States commerce. The Department of Justice (DOJ) also rejected the claim as there was no direct linkage between collusion in the US market and collusion in the plainti¤'s home country. Even if these claims were correct, the DOJ argued, "they do not furnish a basis for jurisdiction under the FTAIA. To allow these claims would con ‡ict directly with the rationales of the Supreme Court's decision, creating many of the very harm to international antitrust enforcement that the Court sought to avoid." 3 1 See Choi and Heiko (in preparation) for a general analysis of collusion in demand related markets that encompasses both the substitute and complement cases. This case illustrates interdependency of collusive behavior across markets and raises the question about the sustainability of price …xing in demand-related (geographical or product) markets. In particular, the underlying argument by Empagran and foreign plainti¤s seems to be that collusion in one market is easier to sustain if there is also collusion in a related market. How does this argument actually work in theory? And does it depend, for example, on the degree of substitutability (here transportation cost) or complementarity of the products?
Furthermore, while looking at this argument is interesting in itself, it is obvious that based on the results important policy questions could be addressed. If, for example, collusion in one market is impossible without collusion in the other, then a targeted antitrust enforcement in one of the two markets is su¢ cient to desist both cartels. However, this possibility also raises the potential for a free rider problem in antitrust enforcement and may call for coordination between antitrust authorities in di¤erent jurisdictions if the enforcement is costly and the enforcement decision is made independently of each other. In contrast, if collusion is easier to sustain if the other market is more competitive, then a global policy e¤ort in all markets might be more e¤ective compared to targeted enforcement.
To address these issues, we construct a model of multi-market contact with antitrust authorities in each market and analyze the interplay of collusion incentives and antitrust enforcement incentives. We characterize equilibrium in …rm behavior and antitrust enforcement policy. In particular, we show that the equilibrium may exhibit a non-linearity in antitrust authorities'enforcement e¤ort decisions as the global economy is more integrated due to a free-rider problem. We also compare the equilibrium enforcement e¤orts with the globally optimum and show that the equilibrium enforcement e¤orts are less than the globally optimal ones. This result suggests for the need to coordinate enforcement e¤orts across jurisdictions.
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature on multi-market contact and antitrust enforcement. The multi-market contact literature is concerned with how contact across markets can a¤ect the degree of collusion that …rms can sustain in settings of repeated competition. The idea was …rst proposed by Edwards (1955). Bernheim and Whinston (1990) formalize Edwards'idea that the multiplicity of contacts among conglomerate …rms may induce "mutual forbearance" and "blunt the edge of their competition." They show that multi-market contacts can be used as a mechanism to pool the incentive constraints across markets. When there is a slack in the incentive constraint in one market, the pooling of the incentive constraints allows the slack to be transferred to the other market where the constraint is binding, thereby aiding collusion in the market with the binding constraint.
Bernheim and Whinston's model, however, is devoid of AA. As a result, the sustainability of collusion in each market is only constrained by the internal incentives to cheat against collusive outcomes. In contrast, we are interested in the interplay of AA's external enforcement and internal incentives to cheat and the sustainability of collusion requires overcoming both internal and external hurdles.
Our paper also relates to the literature on cartel antitrust enforcement. In particular, there is a small, but growing, literature on corporate leniency programs that analyzes the e¤ects of the programs on cartel stability. Motta and Polo (2003), for instance, conduct a positive analysis of leniency programs in which …rms that reveal information about collusion to antitrust authorities receive reduced …nes. They show that leniency programs make ex post enforcement more e¤ective but may have an adverse ex ante incentive e¤ect that encourages cartel formation by decreasing the expected cost of penalty associated with collusion. , in contrast, investigates the optimal design of corporate leniency programs. However, none of these papers deals with multi-market contact. 
The Model
In this section, we describe the basic model of multi-market contact when markets are linked through demand. We derive conditions under which collusion is sustainable in each market, under the assumption that competition authorities always pursue any lead on collusive behavior. The question of optimal antitrust enforcement policy is analyzed in the next section.
Benchmark model: collusion with active competition authorities
Consider the benchmark case with two local markets j = A; B and two …rms, i = 1; 2 selling a homogenous product in both markets. Firms are engaged in a repeated game in which they decide in each period whether to collude on the monopoly price in the respective local market or whether to compete. 4 Firms have a common discount factor of and use eternal grim trigger strategies that punish deviations in one or both markets with competition in both markets. The linkage between the (otherwise symmetric) markets arises through demand. For simplicity, let us use the following "reduced form" set-up. Denote 11 and 10 ( ) the monopoly pro…ts in market j if …rms in the adjacent market collude and compete, respectively. The parameter 2 [0; ] measures the integration of the two markets and/or the transportation costs of the good. If = , the markets are completely independent, i.e. 10 ( ) = 11 . For lower values of , competition in the adjacent market serves as a competitive fringe for the cartel. More speci…cally, the more integrated the markets are, the more restricted is the pricing of the cartel, 0 10 ( ) > 0. For = 0, the markets are completely integrated, 10 (0) = 0. If …rms compete in a market, local pro…ts are zero independent of whether the other market is collusive or competitive.
There are three stages in the enforcement against cartel. First, price-…xing conspiracies need to be discovered. Second, discovered conspiracy schemes need to be prosecuted.
Finally, successfully prosecuted cases need to be penalized to break up the existing cartels and deter any formation of future cartels. The …nal stage of punishment is captured by a …ne imposed on successfully prosecuted cartel members. 5 We assume that the …ne for collusion is …xed by antitrust laws and we treat it as a …xed parameter value of the model. As pointed out by Harrington (2006) , the role of the antitrust authorities in the discovery stage has been minimal in that they are typically a passive agent that responds to complaints by disgruntled employees and suspicious customers who typically provide initial leads on price-…xing schemes. To re ‡ect this reality, we assume that if a cartel exists, AAs receive information about the cartel with a probability of in each period. The information provided to AAs is hard evidence and cannot be fabricated. In this section, we assume that AAs always pursue any leads on cartel and engage in prosecution of cartel. In the next section, we introduce a cost of prosecution and endogenize the prosecution decision of AAs. 6 With the assumption of active AAs, we can summarize antitrust enforcement mechanism as follows. In each market and period an antitrust authority (AA) discovers and prosecutes collusion with a probability of . Assume that this prosecution probability is independent across markets and over time. A convicted …rm pays a …ne of F (> 0). Once convicted …rms do not engage in collusion any more and earn competitive pro…ts in all subsequent periods.
Sustainability of collusion in one market only
Suppose …rms compete in one market, say market B. Then, the pro…ts from collusion in market A are recursively de…ned as
Collusion is incentive compatible for both …rms if these pro…ts exceed the pro…ts from a one-o¤ deviation, i.e. if
Note that this condition is never satis…ed for any positive …ne if (1 ) < 1=2. In addition, the threshold increases in the industry pro…t 10 ( ), i.e. the more industry pro…ts, the easier it is to sustain collusion. This implies that there is an externality across markets in the sustainability of collusion when the two markets are linked by demand relationships. In particular, as the two markets are more integrated (i.e., a lower ), collusion in one market is more di¢ cult to sustain when the other market is competitive It will be useful later to refer to condition (1) as a function of . Condition (1) holds if where is implicitly de…ned by the equality of (1).
Let V 10 be the value function of a representative …rm in one market when the other market is competitive. Then, we have
Sustainability of collusion in both markets
The present discounted value of a …rm if collusion takes place in both markets is given by
If no cartel is detected, collusion persists in both markets. If one cartel is detected, …rms receive the present discounted value from collusion in the other market, V 10 , minus the …ne.
If both cartels are detected, …rms are …ned and stop colluding. Collusion in both markets is sustainable if
Two cases have to be distinguished.
Case 1 F F ( )
In this case, collusion in one market would still be viable even if the cartel in the other market is discovered, that is,
. Therefore, collusion in both markets is sustainable if
Case 2 F > F ( )
In this case, collusion in one market cannot be sustained without collusion in the adjacent market, i.e. V 10 = 0. The incentive constraint for collusion in both markets is simply
Note that when collusion in the remaining market is not sustainable as cartel in the other market is discovered, the threshold value for collusion in both markets (F j V 10 =0 ) is independent of .
An examination of the three threshold values identi…ed so far reveals the following relationships.
Lemma 1 The relationships among
, and F F j V 10 =0 are as follows.
with the equality at = .
(
, and there is a critical value of such that F ( ) F j V 10 =0 if and only if :
Proof. First, note that at = , we have 10 ( ) = 11 by the de…nition of . Thus,
, which proves (ii). Statement (iii) comes from the fact that F ( = 0) = 0 with 10 (0) = 0 and F ( ) is monotonically increasing in while F j V 10 =0 is a constant as a function of .
With the relationships among F ( ); F ( ) j V 10 =V C
10
, and F j V 10 =0 , we can summarize the analysis so far as follows. (ii) if F > F ( ) and F F j V 10 =0 , there is collusion only if the other market is collusive, (iii) otherwise there is no collusion.
; there is collusion in both markets, There are two reasons for the break-down of collusion in this model: internal cartel instability and antitrust enforcement. 7 Proposition 1 re ‡ects the interaction between these two forces. To sustain collusion in both markets, the incentive constraint for cartel stability, condition (2), has to be satis…ed. Rewriting (2) gives
and simplifying yields the incentive constraint of sustaining collusion per market,
The …rst term is the expected collusive surplus from one market if none of the two cartels has been successfully prosecuted. This surplus is positive if the expected, discounted value of not being caught in both markets is larger than the market share gain from deviation.
The second term is the expected penalty from collusion in this market. The third term is the expected continuation value if collusion in the other market breaks down. This value is higher, the higher the transportation cost and the higher 10 ( ).
To see the intuition for the existence of region conditional collusion CjNC, set F = 0. This implies for (1 ) towards 1/2, the second term approaches zero and the condition is never satis…ed. Thus, full collusion in both markets is not sustainable whereas collusion in one market only is. [Also note that for F = 0, region CjC never exist. Either there are no externalities between AAs of di¤erent countries (region NC and AC) or they are negative (region CjNC)]. The intuition for this result is that the incentive to deviate when colluding in both markets is higher than the incentive to deviate when colluding in one market only.
However, the gains from collusion in both markets, i.e. with an exogenous probability , 0 1. This probability is independent across markets and over time. To convict the cartel with this evidence, the AA has to invest C > 0.
In other words, a successful prosecution of a cartel requires incriminating evidence and a prosecution e¤ort from the agency. 8 Once a cartel has been prosecuted it will never be e¤ective again.
De…ne S 11 , S 10 ( ) and S 0 as the per period consumer surplus in a local market if there is collusion in both markets, collusion in this market only, and no collusion, respectively. It holds that
with S 11 0. It is natural to assume that S 10 ( ) is decreasing in with S 10 (0) = S 0 and S 10 ( ) = S 11 . 9 In words, local consumer surplus in a market in which …rms collude is higher the lower the transportation cost, or the more integrated the markets are. 10 Each agency is assumed to maximize the discounted, expected domestic consumer surplus net of its enforcement cost.
Let us start by assuming that the parameter constellation in the …rms'problem is such that …rms would always collude independent of whether there is collusion in the adjacent market or not (i.e. region AC in Figures 1 and 2 ). After deriving the AAs'optimal enforcement strategies we check under which conditions this is indeed optimal …rm behavior given the AAs'strategies.
Enforcement Decision with Collusion in Only One Market
First consider a situation where there is collusion in only one market and cartel in the other market is already broken up. Suppose the local competition authority has received evidence of the cartel and has to decide whether to prosecute or not. To investigate the AA's optimal prosecution decision, let W P and W N P 10 ( ) denote the discounted expected domestic consumer surplus (net of enforcement cost, if any) when the AA actively prosecutes by pursuing any evidence it receives and does not engage in prosecution, respectively. 11
Prosecution is bene…cial if W P W N P 10 ( ), i.e., the stream of future competitive consumer surplus net of the enforcement cost outweighs the stream of future collusive consumer 9 If …rms collude on the monopoly price p m and marginal cost are constant, the prohibitive level of transportation cost is de…ned by = p m c.
1 0 Consider the simplest case of inelastic demand functions in both markets. Consumers value each product at v; there is a marginal cost of c and transportation cost . In this case the link between the pro…t and surplus functions is straightforward. We would have S 11 = 0, S 0 =v c= 11 , S 10 ( ) = v c and 10 ( ) = .
1 1 Note that prosecution leads to competitive market outcome and thus the expected welfare from prosecution does not depend on the status of collusion in the other market, which explains the absence of subscripts and in the expression for W P surplus:
Note that C ( ) is increasing in with C (0) = 0: Thus, condition (6) is more stringent to satisfy as becomes smaller. If the markets are su¢ ciently integrated, the gains from stopping the cartel are low and the local competition authority prefers not to prosecute the cartel. De…ne 0 2 f0; g as the probability of successful antitrust enforcement by the local AA if the adjacent market is competitive. Then the ex ante expected consumer surplus in this market is recursively given by
Enforcement Decision with Collusion in Both Markets
Now suppose both markets are collusive. First, consider the incentives for an equilibrium in which both agencies prosecute their domestic cartel if they …nd evidence. The expected welfare from prosecution is W P = 1 S 0 C as before, which is independent of the other AA's prosecution decision.
In contrast, the expected welfare from non-prosecution depends on the other AA's prosecution decision due to demand externalities across markets. We consider a representative market i and denote the other market as i. Assume the agency in the other market i prosecutes whenever it …nds hard evidence. Then the expected welfare from non-prosecution in market i can be recursively de…ned as follows.
When both markets collude and the AA in the other market actively prosecutes (AA i = P ), the condition for active prosecution in market i is given by W P W N P 11 ( )j AA i =P : Since W N P 11 ( )j AA i =P depends on W 10 , which in turn depends on the value of prosecution cost C, we consider two cases.
Case 1 C C ( )
In this case, we have W 10 = S 10 ( ) 1
and it is straightforward to show that W P W N P 11 ( )j AA i =P : This implies that if an AA would make e¤ort after the other has prosecuted its cartel, then it will surely prosecute when both markets are collusive.
Case 2 C > C ( )
In this case, an AA is not willing to incur prosecution cost when the other has prosecuted its cartel, and we have W 10 = S 10 ( ) 1
: Then W P W N P 11 ( )j AA i =P holds if and only if
then there exists an equilibrium in which both agencies make a prosecution e¤ort after detecting the cartel. Two subcases can arise. If additionally C C ( ) holds, then an agency continues prosecution after the other agency was successful. If C C ( ) does not hold, an agency stops the prosecution once the other agency is successful. Note that the C ( )j AA i =P is increasing in . Thus, the more integrated the markets (or the lower transportation cost), the harder it is to sustain an equilibrium in which both agencies prosecute their domestic cartel.
Next consider the conditions under which there is an equilibrium in which no AA makes a prosecution e¤ort. Suppose both markets are collusive and the AA in market B makes no prosecution e¤ort after detection. In such a case, collusion in both markets will perpetuate without any prosecution in A. Thus, the expected welfare from non-prosecution (NP) is
given by
Non-prosecution is optimal if and only if W N P 11 ( )j AA i =N P W P :
Finally, it follows straight from (7) and
It is immediate that for intermediate values of
two asymmetric equilibria (and a mixed-strategy equilibrium) exist in which exactly one AA exerts prosecution while the other one does not. Let us summarize this analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 [Locally Optimal Prosecution Decisions if Firms Always Collude]:
(i) If C C ( ); there is prosecution by both AA whenever there is hard evidence.
(ii) If C ( ) < C C ( )j AA i =P ; there is prosecution by both AA when the other market is also collusive, but not if the other market is competitive.
there is prosecution by one AA when the other market is also collusive and the other AA does not prosecute.
(iv) If C > C ( )j AA i =N P ; there is no prosecution by either AA.
To derive this result we have been assuming that …rms are colluding independent of whether the adjacent market is collusive or competitive. Let us now check whether this is indeed optimal …rm behavior and focus on the parameter space de…ned by
which is satis…ed for a low penalty F and a low detection rate and a high discount factor . This constraint is a su¢ cient condition for collusion in both markets not being deterred even if both AA prosecute whenever there is evidence.
Two di¤erent cases arise with this assumption. First, if C C ( ), then prosecution stops in one market as soon as the other market is competitive. This in turn implies that …rms receive a higher continuation value, V 10 = ( 10 =2)=(1 ), than in region CjC of Figure   1 , where collusion is conditional. In region CjC collusion in one market breaks down when the adjacent market becomes competitive. However, if (11) holds, collusion is sustainable in region CjC if the adjacent market is collusive. From this follows that, as long as (11) holds, collusion in both markets is always sustainable if prosecution stops when one market becomes competitive. This argument holds for the case where both AA prosecute (i.e.
and, a fortiori, for higher values of C with less prosecution of both cartels. Thus, the prosecution equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is consistent with a …rms'equilibrium in which collusion persists in a local market independent of whether the adjacent market is collusive or competitive. Figure 3 depicts the AAs equilibrium. Regions D, E, F correspond to this …rst case.
In the second case, 0 C <C ( ), both AAs prosecute whenever there is evidence. This is exactly the assumption behind our analysis of the …rms'behavior above (i.e. Proposition In contrast, if < , then after successfully prosecuting one market, collusion in the adjacent market is deterred and breaks down. In this case, our initial assumption to derive the AAs' prosecution equilibrium, i.e. …rms colluding no matter what, is no longer valid.
What is the AAs'prosecution equilibrium in this case? First, note that the condition for an equilibrium with no prosecution from either AA does not change, i.e. C C ( )j AA i =N P .
Then consider the condition for an equilibrium in which both AA prosecute. The breakdown of collusion increases the continuation value with a competitive adjacent market to
. Thus, given the other AA prosecutes, not prosecuting hard evidence now yields
Therefore an equilibrium in which both AA exert the prosecution e¤ort exists if and only if
Thus, in region A of Figure 3 , both AAs prosecute if the adjacent market is collusive.
When one cartel has been successfully prosecuted, the local AA in the collusive market would prosecute the cartel if detected. This is anticipated by the …rms and the cartel breaks down. In region B both AAs always prosecute collusion and …rms collude until they are caught. Finally, as indicated in Figure 3 , there might also exist a region C. De…ne the intersection value of C ( ) and e C j AA i =P as e , i.e.
S 10 (e ) = S 11 + 1 (1 ) (S 0 S 11 ):
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for region C to exist is e which holds for su¢ ciently high. In region C, only one AA prosecutes if there is collusion in both markets.
If successful, collusion in the other market breaks down because …rms anticipate that the local AA would prosecute any hard evidence. What is interesting about this region is that it introduces a non-linearity in the e¤ort equilibrium of the AA. For e , both AAs prosecute if the cost of prosecution is low or medium-to-high. One AA prosecuting is an equilibrium for low-to-medium and high C. The reason is that for low C a local AA can credibly commit to prosecute even if the other market is competitive. Therefore, collusion breaks down in a cascade: if one market is caught, the other one becomes competitive,
too. This in turn, increases the free-rider problem for low C. In the Appendix, we show that such region C exists if is su¢ ciently large. The graph and table summarizes the conditions for the AAs'prosecution e¤ort equilibrium.
Globally Optimal Antitrust Decisions
In section 3, we have analyzed the equilibrium antitrust enforcement decisions when both
AAs act independently to maximize their respective domestic consumer surplus net of enforcement costs. However, the demand linkage across markets suggests that the enforcement equilibrium is not necessarily optimal from the global welfare viewpoint. In particular, cartel enforcement in one country can exert positive externalities by putting downward pressure on the highest collusive price sustainable in the other market and make collusion less desirable. As a result, there will be less enforcement in the equilibrium compared to the globally optimal level of enforcement.
To compare the equilibrium enforcement levels to the globally optimal one, we assume that there is no information sharing between the two AAs in deriving the globally optimal one. In other words, we consider the informationally constrained global optimum policy in which each AA makes a decision without knowing the other agent possesses information that can lead to prosecution in the other market. The next proposition summarizes the globally optimal enforcement policy assuming that …rms always collude.
Proposition 3 [Globally Optimal Prosecution if …rms always collude]:
The following characterizes the globally optimal antitrust policy where
and C G ( )j AA i =N P > C ( )j AA i =N P , which implies that there is too little enforcement e¤ orts by AAs in equilibrium compared to the global optimum.
(i) If C C ( ); there should be prosecution by both AA whenever there is hard evidence.
(ii) If C ( ) < C C G ( )j AA i =P ; there should be prosecution by both AA when the other market is also collusive, but not if the other market is competitive.
there should be asymmetric prosecution when both markets are collusive, with one AA actively prosecuting and the other not prosecuting.
(iv) If C > C G ( )j AA i =N P ; no prosecution by either AA is globally optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed collusion incentives of multinational …rms interacting in several local markets that are linked by substitute products in demand due to the arbitrage constraint across markets. Our focus was on how collusion incentives in one market can be in ‡uenced by competitive conditions in the other market. This analysis has implications for optimal antitrust enforcement decisions for each AA in charge of di¤erent local markets.
There are many unresolved issues. For instance, we have analyzed only the substitute product case in this paper since it is a natural setting in the context of international trade.
However, our preliminary investigation suggests that a very di¤erent picture emerge in terms of collusion and antitrust enforcement incentives in the case of complementary products.
In addition, we have assumed that there is no information sharing between local antitrust authorities in the enforcement. In reality, however, investigation of cartel in one market often leads to additional piece of evidence on cartel in other markets. How the sharing of such information plays out for the enforcement of international cartel can be an important issue in conjunction with the leniency programs in place. We plan to pursue these issues in our companion papers [Choi and Gerlach (in preparation) ].
Proof of Proposition 3. When there is collusion in only one market and cartel in the other market is already broken up, there is no externality from cartel enforcement in the remaining market. Therefore, the optimal policy in the remaining market is also globally optimal, which means that there should be prosecution if and only if W P W N P 10 ( ), i.e., C C ( ). Now we analyze globally optimal enforcement decisions when both markets are collusive.
Once again, it is straightforward to show that if C C ( ) and an AA would make e¤ort after the other has prosecuted its cartel, then it is not only domestically optimal but also globally optimal to prosecute when both markets are collusive regardless of the action of the other AA. From now on, I focus on the parameter region in which C > C ( ) and the enforcement is not carried out when the other market is competitive. To derive the condition under which it is globally optimal for both …rms prosecute, consider the incentive for an AA to prosecute assuming that the other AA also actively pursue prosecution without any information sharing. The expected global welfare (GW) from prosecution is given by
where W P i j AA i =P denotes the other country's welfare when the other country also actively pursues prosecution (AA i = P ). More speci…cally,
The expression above utilizes the fact that AA i will not engage in prosecution once market i is competitive. In contrast, if the country does not prosecute while the other one does, the expected global welfare from non-prosecution is given by
where W N P 11 i j AA i =P denotes the other country's welfare when the other one is the only one that actively pursues prosecution (i.e., AA i = N P and AA i = P ). The value for W N P 11 i j AA i =P is recursively de…ned by
It is globally optimal for both countries to actively engage in prosecution if
To analyze this condition, it is useful to de…ne an externality term from one's prosecution as:
I …rst show that the externality term is always positive for C > C ( ). To see this, note that when AA i = P , the externality arises only in the event that the other country's AA does not receive any evidence. Otherwise, AA i will engage in prosecution and the market will be competitive regardless of the action by AA i . Thus,
For C > C ( ) = 1 (S 0 S 10 ( )), we have
Using the de…nition of E P j AA i =P , the condition for GW P j AA i =P GW N P j AA i =P can be rewritten as
Notice that C ( )j AA i =P is a constant and E P j AA i =P is an increasing function of C. Let us de…ne (C) = C ( )j AA i =P + E P j AA i =P . Then, (C) is an increasing function of C with the slope of 1 (1 ) < 1: Therefore, there is a unique C G ( )j AA i =P such that C (C) if and only if C C G ( )j AA i =P . We know that C ( )j AA i =P (C ( )j AA i =P ) because E P j AA i =P evaluated at C ( )j AA i =P (>C ( )) is positive.
Therefore, C G ( )j AA i =P > C ( )j AA i =P :
By proceeding in a similar way, we can also derive the condition under which it is globally optimal for neither …rms prosecute. Consider the incentive for an AA to prosecute assuming that the other AA does not actively pursue prosecution. The expected global welfare (GW) from prosecution can be written as
where W P i j AA i =N P denotes the other country's welfare when the other country does not actively pursues prosecution (AA i = N P ). More speci…cally,
Once again, the expression above utilizes the fact that AA i will not engage in prosecution when market i is competitive. In contrast, if both AAs do not pursue active prosecution, the expected global welfare is given by GW N P j AA i =N P = W N P 11 ( )j AA i =N P + W N P 11 i j AA i =N P ; where W N P 11 i j AA i =N P denotes the other country's welfare when neither of them pursues prosecution (i.e., AA i = N P and AA i = N P ). Since cartel is never broken up in both countries, we have
It is globally optimal for neither county to actively engage in prosecution if GW N P j AA i =N P GW P j AA i =N P . To analyze this condition, it is useful to de…ne an externality term from one's prosecution as:
It is immediate to see that GW N P j AA i =N P GW P j AA i =N P if and only if C C G ( )j AA i =N P C ( )j AA i =N P + E P j AA i =N P = 1 [S 0 S 11 ] + 1 [S 10 ( ) S 11 ].
Thus, it is globally optimal for neither …rm to engage in prosecution if C C G ( )j AA i =N P , where C G ( )j AA i =N P > C ( )j AA i =N P .
If C is in the intermediate range of [C G ( )j AA i =N P ; C G ( )j AA i =N P ], asymmetric prosecution in which only one country prosecutes is globally optimal.
Existence of region C: Suppose (1 ) 2 1=2. If is su¢ ciently large, then there always exist (F; ) such that e < .
Proof:
is de…ned by
Since increases in F , the maximum , , compatible with (11) is given by e is de…ned by S 10 (e ) = S 11 + 1 (1 ) (S 00 S 11 ) 2 :
Check that 2 increases in with 2 ( = 1=[2(1 ) 2 ]) > S 11 and 2 ( = 1) = S 00 . Since S 10 decreases in with S 10 (0) = S 0 and S 10 ( ) = S 11 , it follows that e decreases in and takes a strictly positive value at = 1=[2(1 ) 2 ] and value 0 at = 1. 
